Monday, January 25, 2016

Do Korean Americans Intermarry with Other Asian Americans?

Dear Korean,

I'm an American of English heritage living on the periphery of Chinatown in Manhattan. Besides the Chinese, many Koreans and Vietnamese own businesses in my neighborhood. I'm curious about the extent of the interaction among different Asian American ethnic groups. For instance, is it common for Korean and Chinese Americans to intermarry?

Stuart


There is survey data on this precise topic thanks to Professor C.N. Le of University of Massachusetts. At his site Asian Nation, Professor Le put together the marriage data for major Asian American ethnic groups.

For Korean Americans, below are the numbers. As you can see, there are three columns of numbers. The first column is for all married couples that include at least one Korean American. The second is for married couples that include at least one Korean American who is raised in the United States. The third column is for married couples, with at least one U.S.-raised Korean American marrying another U.S.-raised person.


Koreans
Men
Korean90.461.144.8
Other Asian2.910.413.0
White5.323.134.6
Black0.20.81.2
Hispanic/Latino0.93.75.3
Multiracial & All Others0.40.71.1
Population Size (x1000)265.447.830.2
Women
Korean68.135.424.1
Other Asian3.69.29.8
White24.448.457.7
Black1.41.61.9
Hispanic/Latino1.32.73.3
Multiracial & All Others1.22.73.3
Population Size (x1000)351.572.658.4

Please do visit the site for other ethnic groups, as the results are highly interesting.

The numbers indicate that Korean Americans regularly marry outside of their ethnicity, particularly if they were raised in the United States. It also shows that Korean Americans marry other Asian Americans at the rate of around 10 percent among U.S.-raised Korean Americans. One's definition of "common" may differ from person to person, but TK would say one out of ten is a fairly common occurrence.

Got a question or a comment for the Korean? Email away at askakorean@gmail.com.

Monday, January 11, 2016

The Code

Dear Korean,

I've been trying to sign up for Korean websites, but they always ask for this weird number sequence and stuff like your ID. I have no idea what to enter and I'm wondering what they are asking for and why.

Claudia


Short answer: the number is the Resident Registration Number, or 주민등록번호.

Every Korean is given an RRN when their birth certificate is issued. RRN is somewhat like the Social Security Number in the United States, but the use of RRN in Korea is a bit more comprehensive than the SSN use in the United States. As Claudia noticed, it is fairly commonplace for Korean websites to require an RRN for registration.


Can a non-Korean receive an RRN? Nope. But it is possible for non-Koreans to receive an equivalent number, called Foreigner Registration Number (외국인등록번호). Here is the catch, however: FRN is only for non-Koreans who are staying in Korea for more than 90 days, i.e. non-tourists who need to maintain a life in Korea in the form of opening bank accounts, etc. It is true that more and more Korean websites are refraining from asking for an RRN for registration, or have set up a separate track of registration for non-Koreans. But if you are a non-Korean who wants to join a Korean website, and the site requires an RRN, you are out of luck.

But things may change down the line. Late last year, the Constitutional Court of Korea invalidated a portion of the Resident Registration Act that forbade Koreans from changing their RRN, and gave the National Assembly until 2018 to pass a new law that is consistent with its decision. Currently, there is a great deal of public discussion in Korea about how RRN is an outdated system that puts too much personal information at stake. In the new system, RRN may disappear entirely; even if it does not disappear, the RRN use may be limited to a more limited set of purposes compared today. Until then, stay tuned.

Got a question or a comment for the Korean? Email away at askakorean@gmail.com.

Monday, January 4, 2016

Korea-Japan Agreement on Comfort Women

If an apology is not followed by contrition and self-reflection, but instead by gloating--“we apologized, so that ought to shut'em up”--does that apology mean anything? That is the core question that the Korean public is facing with respect to the recent agreement regarding Comfort Women between Korea and Japan.

On December 29, 2015, South Korea and Japan reached an agreement under which the Comfort Women issue was considered "finally and irreversibly" resolved. Under the agreement, the Japanese government issued a statement that read:
The issue of comfort women, with an involvement of the Japanese military authorities at that time, was a grave affront to the honor and dignity of large numbers of women, and the Government of Japan is painfully aware of responsibilities from this perspective. 
As Prime Minister of Japan, Prime Minister Abe expresses anew his most sincere apologies and remorse to all the women who underwent immeasurable and painful experiences and suffered incurable physical and psychological wounds as comfort women.

In addition to this statement, the Japanese government pledged to contribute one billion yen (~USD 8.3 million), out of the Japanese government's budget, to a foundation established by the Korean government, whose funding will go toward assisting the surviving Comfort Women.

This agreement sounds fairly good on its face. But the Korean public is generally unhappy with it, with many good reasons. First among the reasons is that the actual victims, namely the surviving Comfort Women, were completely shut out from the negotiation of the agreement. The 46 surviving Comfort Women were not even aware that the Korean government is negotiating for this agreement; they did not learn of this agreement until the media reported it. In a cruel irony, the surviving Comfort Women were initially confused by a sudden flood of congratulatory messages from international organizations, which mistakenly believed that the surviving Comfort Women managed to reach an accord with the Japanese government.

Ultimately, the surviving Comfort Women are unhappy with the agreement for the same reason as the Korean public's: the obvious phoniness of the apology. Normally, an apology is a recognition of past wrongdoing, followed by a period of contrition and self-reflection. In this instance, however, neither the Japanese government nor Prime Minister Shinzo Abe showed any self-reflection about how Imperial Japan brutally kidnapped, raped and murdered hundreds of thousands of women under the vile euphemism of "Comfort Women." Instead, Abe followed up the agreement with triumphant gloating, as he stated: "there will be no future reference at all to this issue [the Comfort Women issue]. We will not raise it in the next Japan-Korea summit meeting. This is the end. There will be no more apology."

(Compare Abe's statement to German Chancellor Angela Merkel's statement in 2013: "Naturally, [Germany has] an everlasting responsibility for the crimes of national-socialism, for the victims of World War II, and above all, for the Holocaust.")

Only an idiot would believe that Shinzo Abe, son of a suspected Class A war criminal in the post-WWII Tokyo Tribunal, would feel sorry about Comfort Women. Yet the length that his administration traveled to display the hollowness of this apology is nonetheless impressive in a twisted way. Even as it was issuing an apology, the Japanese government demanded that Korea remove a Comfort Women memorial statue in front if the Japanese embassy in Seoul. Although this demand was not formalized into an agreement, Japanese officials are already telling the media that the Japanese government would not pay the fund in the agreement unless the memorial statue was removed.

Comfort Women memorial statue, in front of the Japanese Embassy in Seoul.
(source)

Speaking of the payment: the Japanese government strenuously denies that the money is a legal reparation for the damages that the Comfort Women suffered. This is consistent with Japan's position on Comfort Women thus far: that it did not violate any law in conscripting Korean women into forced sex slavery. Because Japan does not think it committed any crime, there is no damage to recompense as far as it is concerned. 

(If you were curious: the surviving Comfort Women receive a pension from the Korean government, and they do not need the money. One of the points that the Comfort Women have consistently made is that any money paid by Japan should be an expression of its legal responsibility.)

So this is what we have: a statement of apology, followed by gloating. An acceptance of responsibility, followed by denial of legal responsibility. A pledge to pay money as an apologia, followed by the demand to erase the crime from the public memory. 

This is another rendition of Japan's playbook with respect to its war crimes. In its heart of hearts, Japan steadfastly believes that it did nothing wrong leading up to and during World War II. Was Imperial Japan wrong to colonize Korea and China? No--Japan was only trying to protect Asia from European powers. Was Imperial Japan wrong to bomb Pearl Harbor? No--the United States forced Japan's hand by setting up a trade embargo. Was Imperial Japan wrong to kidnap hundred of thousands of women--many of whom were no more than 13, 14 years old--and force them into sexual slavery, to be raped by dozens of soldiers every day? No--war is bad for everyone, and at any rate, Comfort Women are lying whores who volunteered to join the war effort. 

This sick and disgusting worldview is so deeply rooted into the Japanese consciousness that any Japanese statement to the contrary is no more than a cynical bargaining chip, tossed in order to lower the heat of international outrage directed at the worldview's heinousness. Because Japan (and in particular, Japan's conservatives led by the current prime minister) cannot bring itself to mean what it says, Japan must always follow up its statements with a series of attempts to run away from them as quickly as possible.

Question, then, is: what should Korea and Koreans do about this?

(More after the jump)

Got a question or a comment for the Korean? Email away at askakorean@gmail.com.




Most Koreans are dissatisfied, many angry, with the agreement. TK is also outraged. In addition to everything in the foregoing, TK finds Korean president Park Geun-hye's incompetence in negotiating this agreement particularly aggravating. At the negotiating table, Korea was at an unusually strong position. Japan's crimes were heinous, and their then-position was appalling. The surviving Comfort Women were very old and passing away, which added to the urgency of resolution. Most importantly, the United States--the most important ally for both Japan and Korea--was pushing for a resolution. Park administration pissed away these advantages. It could have extracted so many more concessions from Japan (for example, personal visits of the prime minister to the surviving Comfort Women to hand-deliver letters of apology,) and it simply did not.

So what to do about this? This is the point at which TK parts company with majority of the Korean public. Many Koreans, including Korea's opposition party, are calling for nullifying the agreement. I do not think that is a wise course of action.

What Koreans want--naturally and correctly--is Japan's contrition over these crimes. Koreans want Japan to admit that Japan was wrong to colonize Korea, wrong to begin a global war, and wrong to conscript a million Koreans to serve as slaves for the machinery of war. Koreans want from Japan those admissions with sincere self-reflection about its crimes, minus all the bullshit evasive maneuvers that Japan has taken so far, including in this agreement.

I want the same exact thing. But I do not think that an international agreement would achieve that end--especially not the kind signed by Shinzo Abe.

I believe Koreans would be well served to stare down the unyielding reality, that the agreement is ultimately a political document, and politics is the art of the possible. What Koreans want is moral vindication. Politics can indeed achieve moral vindication. (Post-World War II Germany, for example.) But to achieve the moral vindication, one must keep playing the politics.

It is not practically possible for Korea to re-negotiate. A strong poker hand loses its strength after the round is over. The showdown, unfortunately, came and went; all the advantages that Korea did have previous to this agreement no longer exist. The fact that the Park Geun-hye administration failed to maximize its advantages is rage-inducing, but there is no reason to expect that Korea can do any better in the hypothetical next round.

However unsatisfying, the gains from this agreement are not insignificant. In a number of ways, this agreement is in fact a step forward from Japan's previous statements. Japan did recognize that the Japanese military was involved in the conscription of Comfort Women without the evasive qualification. (Previously, Japan recognized the military's involvement, but also insisted that the military usually did not recruit directly.) The Japanese government did speak of its "responsibility" without qualifiers like "moral responsibility" (notwithstanding Japan's subsequent attempt to characterize its payment as an anything-but-legal-reparations.) The agreement stated that Abe was speaking as the representative of the Japanese nation, not as a mere individual. Japan is paying money out of its government budget, not through private citizens' donations.

These gains are not nothing. Although they are inadequate standing alone, skillful politicking can capitalize them into serving the true end of justice. Although the Japanese government is attempting to wiggle away from its apology as soon as it is written down, the words of the apology have independent strength. Against the backdrop of the words like "with an involvement of the Japanese military authorities" and Japan's "responsibilities," Japan's further attempts of evasion can only become more technical, tendentious and petty.

The thing to do, then, is not to demand a new round of governmental apology from Japan; it is to simply hold Japan to the words onto which it just signed. There is enough in those words to compel Japan to recognize the wrong that it had committed. Specifically, Japan must be made to answer these basic questions regarding Comfort Women:
Is it true that the Japanese military operated rape centers, euphemistically called Comfort Stations, for the pleasure of its soldiers?
Is it true that the Japanese military staffed these rape centers with hundreds of thousands young women, some as young as 13 or 14 years old, who were kidnapped from Korea?
Was it wrong for Japan to operate these rape centers, where hundreds of thousands of Korean women were raped dozens of times, every day for years?
These questions should be asked over and over again, until there is an unqualified "yes" to all of these questions from every meaningful level of the Japanese society--including the government, the universities, the media, conservatives, liberals, everyone. And if anyone answers "no" to any one of the questions above, there is now a ready retort: why did the Japanese government sign a statement saying otherwise?

Got a question or a comment for the Korean? Email away at askakorean@gmail.com.